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“Take the sum of human achievement in action, in science, in art, in literature—subtract 
the work of the men above 40, and while we should miss great treasures even priceless 
treasures, we would practically be where we are today . . . The effective, moving, vitalizing 
work of the world is done between the ages of 25 and 40” (Bliss, 1991, p. 323). Dr. William 
Osler—author, professor, and esteemed physician—spoke those words in 1905 when he 
was 55 years old and leaving the employment of Johns Hopkins for a prestigious position 
at Oxford University. He went on to say, “. . . the uselessness of men above 60 years of age, 
and the incalculable benefit it would be in commercial, political and in professional life if, 
as a matter of course, men stopped work at this age” (p. 323). Osler continued by alluding 
to a euthanasia scheme from Anthony Trollope’s novel, The Fixed Period. His comments 
were meant to cleverly reflect his humility for his own work and critique the status of uni-
versities that hired faculty for life. His sarcasm and subtleties were missed by much of the 
media reporting on the farewell address, and they assumed he was truly in favor of eutha-
nasia (e.g., The New York Times, 1905). Despite Dr. Osler’s cynical intent, soon some older 
Americans feared being oslerized (Elster, 2006). 
Why did the media and society in general respond in such a way to Dr. Osler’s sarcastic 
comments? Perhaps Dr. Osler spoke what many silently believed and felt about older 
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adults and the process of growing older. Even though he had a humorous intent, his com-
ments seemed believable by many who heard them. At the time of Dr. Osler’s speech, the 
United States was still in the process of transforming from an agrarian to industrial society. 
In more agrarian societies, old age is generally venerated, but in industrialized societies 
older people lose their place of authority (Butler, 2009). As such, old age is no longer re-
spected but feared. 
Certainly if Dr. Osler made his same speech today and it was taken at face value, it 
would create a stir, but for what reason? Would it be true or feigned outrage? Now, over 
a century later, 40 is popularly referred to as the “new 30” (Tierney, 2004) with it common 
for people to start careers or families at 40 years of age or older. Statistics and anecdotes 
substantiate an underlying and ubiquitous notion that growing older is something to fight 
(Nelson, 2002). In the current chapter, I will first detail the legal framework for workplace 
age discrimination and court case examples that have largely mirrored race and gender 
discrimination law. Next, I will discuss the psychological research that details the conse-
quences of age discrimination with a particular focus on the combined effects of stereotype 
assimilation and notions of deservingness of respect. Last, I will suggest that until we know 
the causes of age discrimination, we cannot legitimately address its consequences the same 
way we have addressed other forms of discrimination. Specifically, I will argue that legis-
lating against age discrimination is inherently different from laws against other forms of 
discrimination because of the fundamental distinctions between the discrimination targets 
(e.g., that most people will develop into the target group for age, but that similarly cannot 
occur with most other target groups). In other words, making laws that ban age discrimi-
nation is a futile attempt to prohibit the fear and misconceptions of growing old. 
 
Legal Framework for Workplace Age Discrimination 
 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful to discrim-
inate in employment settings based on older age.1 The Act is intended to protect applicants 
and employees 40 years of age or older from age-based discrimination when employers 
make decisions about hiring, promotion, compensation, and other job-related determina-
tions. The ADEA was enacted based on the premise that older workers were disadvan-
taged in finding, retaining, and regaining employment. The Act states that its purpose is 
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination and promote employment for older persons based 
on their abilities (Sec. 2). At its inception, the Act was limited to persons who were at least 
40 but less than 65 years of age. In the 20 years that followed its enactment, the upper age 
limit was first extended to age 70 and then eliminated entirely (with some exceptions) 
(Frolik & Barnes, 2007). Before the law was enacted, many private job openings included 
age-based limits (Bessey & Ananda, 1991; Graebner, 1984). In fact, more than 60% of non-
skilled industrial jobs had age limits between 35 and 49 years old (Bessey & Ananda, 1991), 
and mandatory retirement policies were quite common (Frolik & Barnes, 2007). 
Age discrimination law is based on the template of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
(Van Ostrand, 2009). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces 
these discrimination laws, and the courts often apply Title VII–type analyses. But, it was 
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clear even before its inception that age discrimination was distinct from discrimination 
protected under Title VII. Congress originally rejected proposals to include age with the 
other protected classes within Title VII (Eglit, 1986). Not until Williard Wirtz, then Secre-
tary of Labor, reported to Congress that workplace age discrimination was a problem 
(Wirtz, 1965) did Congress pass the ADEA. Through his report,Wirtz demonstrated that, 
unlike racial discrimination, age discrimination was not based on hatred or dislike of the 
older workers, rather the discrimination was based on faulty assumptions about older per-
son’s abilities. Therefore, from the very beginning, the ADEA did not endeavor to address 
vindictive employment policies but rather general societal negative, and usually untrue, 
notions about growing old. Despite the superficial similarities between Title VII and the 
ADEA, the ADEA’s original goal was quite different from addressing discrimination based 
on hostile intent that is commonly believed to be the underlying basis for racial and gender 
discrimination (Crosby & Dovidio, 2008). In other words, the ADEA purposed to promote 
the new and continued employment of older persons by addressing the misconceptions 
about older workers. 
Notwithstanding the intentions and progress of the ADEA, workplace age discrimina-
tion still occurs. In the four decades since the inception of the ADEA, US courts have ad-
dressed a number of issues arising in alleged cases of age discrimination. Case law primarily 
focuses on the issues of (1) disparate treatment, and (2) adverse impact. Both types of claims 
are addressed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s model from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green (1973)2 as amended by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000). Under dis-
parate treatment, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were intentionally treated less fa-
vorably because they are older (i.e., within the protected age group). Under adverse impact, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate, usually with statistical data (Labriola, 2009), that a facially 
neutral employment policy has more negative effects on employees within the protected 
age group.Within both types of claims, courts have grappled with how plaintiffs can prove 
age discrimination—how much burden should be placed on the employee versus the em-
ployer, what kind of evidence is appropriate, and how much evidence is sufficient (chapter 
1 by R. L. Wiener and S. N. Keller, this volume). Generally, the courts have answered these 
questions for ADEA claims by applying principles from Title VII (Green, 2005). 
The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in hiring decisions, but these kinds of cases are 
extremely difficult because there are generally no records of why a person was not offered 
a job, or why an interview was not extended. The courts usually defer to the judgment of 
the employers in choosing among qualified candidates and allow subjective evaluations of 
candidate’s employment suitability (Shute v. Vigo County School, 1993), but sometimes an 
older employee is able to successfully demonstrate discrimination in hiring (Byrnie v. Town 
of Cromwell, 2001). In general, the courts are reluctant to act as a “super-personnel” depart-
ment (Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 2001) second-guessing business decisions (Shute v. Vigo 
County School, 1993). This means that absent clear evidence of discrimination in hiring, an 
older applicant will have a very difficult time establishing a cause of action (Frolik & Barnes, 
2007). Many times not only will there not be reasons provided to the applicant why some-
one else was given the job but there may not be any paper record of the company’s hiring 
processes (Frolik & Barnes, 2007). 
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Because of the difficulty in establishing a discrimination in hiring decision case, most 
of the age discrimination case law involves those decisions that occur once a person has 
been hired—specifically, employment termination and advancement. These cases will have 
more of a “paper trail” than the hiring decisions and that should make them somewhat 
easier to prove. Companies are often required to make a reduction in force that involves 
reducing positions and employee numbers (e.g., Sprint/United Management Company v. 
Mendelsohn, 2008), and companies must also decide who to promote (e.g., Whitman v. Mi-
neta, 2008). Both instances are fraught with decision making that can lead to age discrimi-
nation or suspicions of age discrimination. 
In demonstrating that an employer discriminated against an employee in termination 
or promotion decisions, the employee can establish a claim based on direct or indirect ev-
idence of discrimination. Direct evidence denotes a specific link between the discrimina-
tory employment action and the underlying negative attitudes toward older adults (Yates 
v. Rexton, 2001). Indirect, or circumstantial, evidence is proof that does not facially suggest 
discrimination, but a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that such discrimination did 
occur. In addition, the discrimination source must be a company decision maker (Rowan v. 
Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 2004) and in the context of company decision making 
(Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 1998). Sometimes workplace comments are indicative of negative 
stereotypes held in the workplace (McCann & Giles, 2002). Statements about an employee 
being “too damn old to do [his] job” and that he “was so old [he] must have come over on 
the Mayflower” (Reeves v. Sanderson, 2000, p. 2110) were found to be evidence of discrimi-
nation. In contrast, another supervisor told co-workers that he planned to replace a 63-
year-old female employee “with a young chippie with big tits” (Glanzman v. Metropolitan 
Management Corporation, 2004). Because there were other reasons for the employee’s dis-
missal, an age discrimination case was unfounded. These two cases (Reeves and Glanzman) 
exemplify how the courts can differentially weigh evidence of age discrimination. 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services (2009) the Supreme Court decided an issue that had 
been dividing the circuit courts. Jack Gross at age 54 was reassigned to a different position 
while his former position was given to someone younger. At trial, the jury was instructed 
that they should find in favor of Gross if his age was a “motivating factor” in his em-
ployer’s decision. After an appeal and reversal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
saying not only were the jury instructions incorrect but also the ADEA supports a cause of 
action only if the employment decision was made “because of” age. In other words, the 
mixed motives jury instructions are not appropriate in ADEA claims the way they are for 
Title VII claims. In other discrimination cases (i.e., those involving race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin), a complainant can establish that the discrimination was a motivating 
factor for an employment decision, even if other factors were also at play. The Gross case 
makes age discrimination cases more difficult for plaintiffs because the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove that the adverse employment decision resulted because of the employee’s 
age (see chapter 1 by R. L. Wiener and S. N. Keller, this volume). 
A difficulty and difference with age discrimination versus other cases of discrimination 
is the continuous senescence of the protected class. Not only is a person’s class designation 
mutable based on chronological age (i.e., as a person ages they will become part of the 
protected class) but, unlike gender and race, protected and unprotected status is not 
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mutually exclusive. An age discrimination case could involve a situation where an em-
ployer wrongfully chooses one member of the protected class (e.g., a 45-year-old) over an-
other member of the protected class (e.g., a 70-year-old) (Bessey & Ananda, 1991). The 
important consideration is that he or she is younger than the plaintiff (O’Conner v. Consol-
idated Coin Centers Corp., 1996). And, designations of less “senior people” can legitimately 
mean less time in the company (Bell v. Raytheon, 2009). Similarly, even the use of the word 
“old” can hold the double meaning of “old” as in later chronological age that might indi-
cate discrimination or “old” as in former employee that would not indicate discrimination 
(E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa Co., 2007). Despite the intentions of the ADEA, the above sampling of 
cases demonstrates that workplace age discrimination still occurs and may be more legally 
difficult to prove than other forms of discrimination. This is particularly troubling because 
the older adult population is the only group that transcends all other protected classes and 
is virtually inevitable for everyone. 
 
Empirical Research and Implications for Workplace Age Discrimination 
 
As more baby boomers reach and exceed retirement age, crass statements and discrimina-
tory policies against older adults will likely increase. Of course, if a workplace situation 
turns into a court case, that means a claim was raised by an employee or applicant, and 
pursuant to Gross, there is a heavy burden on the employee. How many other ageist inter-
actions occur without legal attention? Unfortunately psychological research suggests that 
it is likely that many, if not most, cases of age discrimination are never brought, and if a 
plaintiff does bring a claim it is difficult to prove and may be particularly difficult for an 
older plaintiff simply because of accessibility issues (Adams, 2000; Dunlop, Rothman, & 
Entzel, 2000). The next section will examine two reasons why this may be true: (1) negative 
attitudes against aging are prevalent because ageist stereotypes are socially acceptable, and 
(2) older adults may feel that they are deserving of less respect and therefore they unknow-
ingly and without complaint accept the negative stereotypes and treatment. 
 
Societal Acceptability of Ageism 
Recent medical and safety advances have significantly increased the life expectancy in the 
United States and other industrialized nations (Arias, 2006). Yet, people do still physically 
and mentally change as they age. Although many age-based changes are easily visible yet 
considered nonpathological—such as graying of the hair or wrinkling of the skin (Warner, 
2003)—other physical and cognitive changes create vulnerabilities in a person’s body and 
mind that increase the risks of injury, illness, and ultimately death (Miller, 1999). Importantly, 
even with the vulnerabilities that come with aging, older adults mostly function within 
normal levels of cognition (Dunkin & Kasl-Godley, 2000) and can be actively involved in 
society (Jarvik & Small, 2000). Research is mixed about the effects of aging on intelligence. 
Most research suggests that fluid intelligence (ability to solve novel problems without any 
prior training) declines slightly with age (Stuart-Hamilton, 2003, but see Beier & Acker-
man, 2003), but crystallized intelligence (knowledge a person has) remains unchanged and 
can even improve. Although fluid intelligence and memory ability declines are thought to 
be inevitable, they may be inflated by self-report. As a case in point, Parkin and Walter’s 
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(1992) older adult participants were significantly less confident than younger participants 
about their abilities even when they were correct in the memory task. In other words, re-
search on intelligence and memory certainly does not support discriminating in employ-
ment situations based solely on age—the evidence simply is not there to indicate that age 
is a clear indication of inability. 
Research suggests that negative age stereotypes are more prevalent than gender and 
race stereotypes (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). The prevalence of these ageist stere-
otypes leads to older adults trying to appear younger in order to succeed at work (Lee, 
Czaja, & Sharit, 2009; Leonard & Johnson, 2007). Many older workers believe that in order 
to break through the “silver ceiling” they must look younger (Weiss, 2002), Currently, Bo-
tox injections (used to reduce the appearance of wrinkles) are the most popular cosmetic 
surgery procedure. In fact, “Botox Parties” are opportunities for groups of people to enjoy 
a festive atmosphere while reducing the appearance of aging (Sobel, 2002). 
Society in general places a strong emphasis on youth and vitality (Pasupathi & Locken-
hoff, 2002). Television shows and commercials rarely include older adults but when they 
are present, older adults are generally portrayed as comically amusing either physically, 
cognitively, or sexually (Zebrowitz & Motepare, 2000). Similar biases are also found in 
children’s story books (Ansello, 1978). Even in death it seems we are age-biased. Anderson 
and Han (2008) coded how old people looked in their obituary pictures and compared that 
age to actual age at death. They found that the age discrepancy increased with age. In other 
words, obituary pictures are less age-accurate the older the deceased was at the time of 
death. 
Our societal obsession with youth results in real-world implications. Studies that mimic 
human resource managers choosing between resumes that are identical except for the age 
of the applicant, consistently find that the younger applicants are chosen more frequently 
(Nelson, 2002). In a field study, Lahey (2005) sent out 4,000 resumes, varied only by the 
age of the applicant, in two different cities for entry-level positions. A younger worker was 
more than 40% more likely to be called for an interview than an older worker. This may be 
because older potential employees are seen as difficult to train and likely to have lower job 
performance (Avolio & Barrett, 1987). 
Research has also demonstrated an attribution double standard. When young people 
forget, it is attributed to lack of effort or attention. In contrast, when an older adult forgets 
it is attributed to memory decline or incompetence (Erber, 1989; Erber, Etheart, & Szuchman, 
1992; Erber, Szuchman, & Etheart, 1993). Furthermore, older employees are more likely to 
be punished for their poor performance than younger employees. For instance, older em-
ployees who performed poorly were more likely to receive a demotion, while younger 
employees who performed poorly were more likely to receive training recommendations 
(Rupp, Vodanovich, & Credé, 2006). 
 
Procedural Fairness and the Self-Acceptance of Ageism 
The problems of negative stereotyping of older adults and discrimination based on those 
stereotypes may be compounded on societal and individual levels because of the effects of 
procedural fairness and unfairness. Chapter 11 by L. Heuer (this volume) reviewed 
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procedural justice research for the purposes of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities, but I will extend his review to apply specifically to the older worker. 
Procedural justice research has taught us that workers who are fired or not hired in a 
discriminatory way will value fair processes when making determinations of satisfaction. 
The way people are treated—the procedures employed—can affect how satisfied they are 
independent of the outcome or the outcome fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978). Fur-
ther, the treatment that a person receives (e.g., being asked to provide input) provides in-
formation about a person’s standing and value within the group (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 
1989). Chapter 11 by L. Heuer (this volume) provides empirical evidence that the following 
three concepts may moderate the influence of procedural fairness: (1) a person’s notion of 
deservingness, (2) the different notions of procedural fairness between a decision maker 
and a decision recipient, and (3) what members of other groups think about the person’s 
group. For the purposes of age discrimination, the first and third—deservingness and in-
group versus out-group—are important considerations and are discussed next. 
Heuer’s research suggests that a person’s notion of their own deservingness of respect 
contributes to their beliefs about how fairly they were treated. In other words, a person 
who is involved in undesirable behavior or attributes will not be seen as deserving of fair, 
respectful, and unbiased treatment. Based on various empirical findings and theories, a 
nondisabled or disabled worker’s motive (e.g., just world belief, own group superiority, 
group inequality justification) can create a belief that a person with disabilities has less 
because they deserve less and therefore deserve less fair treatments. Because the deserv-
ingness effect can influence judgments of one’s own deservingness, older workers might 
view inability to obtain or retain employment as what they deserve. In fact, because they 
are in the disadvantaged position of being older they may further justify the inequalities 
they experience on the job. These same feelings of worthlessness may decrease the likeli-
hood that an older person would pursue a discrimination case. Further, older applicants 
may even change their expectations for the type of employment they can obtain (Berger, 
2009). This lowered expectation means that an older adult’s feelings of inadequacies are so 
deeply ingrained that they may not feel worthy to even apply for some jobs, which means 
the discrimination is possibly occurring at a deeper level than can be detected through the 
legal system. 
The role of the group has been an integral component in procedural fairness research, 
but chapter 11 by L. Heuer (this volume) describes the intergroup, rather than only the 
intragroup effect. We know that respect can provide us with information about our stand-
ing within our own group, and Heuer’s recent work suggests that respect may also tell us 
something about what the out-group thinks of our in-group. In each of his described stud-
ies, regardless of the group or the source, when respect was present then procedures were 
judged to be fairer. Heuer further suggests that if the workers with disabilities view them-
selves as having a collective social identity, and they view that social identity as the reason 
for their disadvantage, then the mistreatment they receive could increase their desire, and 
formulation of, a movement to obtain equal access and fair treatment. Because of the life-
course segmentation and segregation based on age (Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2005), the col-
lective social identity of older adults may be as strong as or stronger than the collective 
social identity Heuer describes for people with disabilities. Our general social structure is 
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based on a segregation that imposes age-based restrictions upon children and juveniles 
while providing retirement benefits and social services for older adults. For the rest of the 
age groups, the focus is on increasing wealth and offspring (Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2006) 
with the family being the one place that people of different generations interact. In fact, 
older adults are generally segregated into different activities and separate places of resi-
dence (e.g., assisted living facilities or nursing homes). This clear segmentation of our so-
ciety combined with the strong organizational power of groups such as the AARP (formerly 
the American Association of Retired Persons) it seems likely that older adults, similar to 
people with disabilities, would view themselves as having a collective social identity, 
which will increase the likelihood that they will attempt to obtain fairness and equality. 
It is possible that having a collective social identity would increase the likelihood of 
dissatisfaction and result in oppositional action, but when an older adult is treated as if 
they are incompetent they may act in stereotype-confirming ways, otherwise known as 
stereotype assimilation. Research that exposes older adult participants to ageist stereotypes 
leads to the participants acting consistent with the stereotypes (Horton, Baker, Pearce, & 
Deakin, 2008). Eventually, this stereotype assimilation can lead to an actual decrease in 
older adults’ abilities (Bugental & Hehman, 2007), even when the older adults are unaware 
they have been primed with negative aging stereotypes (Levy, 1996). Therefore, older adults 
who are repeatedly exposed to negative ageist stereotypes in the workplace and other in-
teractions can assimilate to those stereotypes, which can lead to actual decreases in ability. 
By combining Heuer’s deservingness element of procedural fairness with stereotype 
assimilation research, we can surmise that older adults might not view themselves as de-
serving of respect. The negative and discriminatory treatment they receive may influence 
their notions of their own abilities, which could influence actual abilities. That means that 
an older adult may be treated as if they are incompetent, resulting in them believing they 
are less competent, and acting less competent. These issues of competency combined with 
feeling that they deserve less respect, older adults may be less likely to raise objections to 
negative and discriminatory treatment because they view the negative treatment as getting 
what they deserve. Obviously, this cyclical spiral toward self-devaluation should be ad-
dressed, but are laws against it the solution? 
 
Legislation Against Age Discrimination Is Not the Answer 
 
When we hear that someone has cancer, we would all like to blame a specific cause, but 
passing legislation against cancer will not stop its spread. On the other hand, legislation 
against cancer-causing agents such as asbestos has reduced the spread of lung cancer. In 
order to be able to pass that legislation, researchers had to first determine that asbestos 
was causing lung cancer. Psychological research on ageism is relatively new (Nelson, 
2002), and research on the causes of ageism is scant compared to the causes of other forms 
of discrimination. Some believe that ageism is caused by the fear and misunderstanding of 
what growing old will entail (Martens, Goldenberg, & Greenberg, 2005; Nelson, 2005). 
Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) explains this 
fear as coming from the apprehension of one’s own death (see chapter 2 by T. D. Nelson, 
this volume). Interacting with older adults is believed to increase mortality salience, which 
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increases anxiety. Specifically, when young people are made mortality salient, they will 
harden their stereotypes against older adults because confronting older age reminds the 
younger person that death is inevitable (Martens et al., 2005). The anxiety and fear that are 
associated with death lead to blaming older people. Blaming someone for getting older 
allows younger people to trick themselves into believing that they will not also eventually 
grow old (and eventually die). Pursuant to Terror Management Theory, we can respond 
to the misfortunes of others by believing that the same result will not befall us. In all like-
lihood, such a belief is true for fears of becoming other groups that experience discrimina-
tion. Most people will not become disabled, another gender, or another race. In contrast, 
more than most of us will die. 
Although somewhat compelling, Terror Management Theory is not a universally accepted 
rationale for ageism (Lerner, 1997), and it falls short in explaining the worldview defense 
and stereotypical attitudes toward the elderly. First, Terror Management Theory postu-
lates that a person relies on their cultural worldview as the one constant aside from the 
knowledge of their death. Therefore, those who are in the out-group represent a different 
worldview and threaten one’s own worldview. The main problem is that older people are 
supporters of the cultural worldview and therefore do not generally threaten the worldview 
(Greenberg, Schimel, & Martens, 2002) and should therefore comfort rather than distress a 
young person. Second, Terror Management Theory does not explain the dichotomous ste-
reotyping of older adults. Stereotyping research informs us that older adults are generally 
seen as “doddering, but dear” (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). Fiske and her colleagues have found 
that people often categorize based on two distinct dimensions—competence and warmth 
(Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Older adults generally are categorized as low on com-
petence and high on warmth, which is similar to people with mental or physical disabilities. 
The resulting prejudice is generally one of pity and sympathy, in other words, a paternal-
istic prejudice rather than an intentionally malicious prejudice. 
Another possible cause of ageism beyond a potential fear of death and sympathy for 
the aged may simply be the way we segregate our society based on age. It has become 
quite rare, outside the family, for people of different age groups to interact (Hagestad & 
Uhlenberg, 2006). Even within the family, we segregate the older members and only inter-
act on limited and infrequent occasions. The misunderstanding of growing older may re-
sult partly from a simple lack of knowledge. 
If the underlying reason for our ageist beliefs stem from fear of dying, sympathy, or 
misunderstanding, then the consequences of age discrimination must be distinguished 
from the consequences of racial or gender discrimination. These other forms of discrimi-
nation are generally believed to stem from hate or power differential goals. The underlying 
reason for the discrimination should dictate how it is addressed. 
A first step in the process should be a general awareness among researchers of the need 
for elder research as it relates to psychology and law (see Brank, 2007). More specifically, 
research should endeavor to determine the causes of ageism. It seems fairly clear that age-
ism occurs, but why? Are we ageist because we fear death, we feel sorry for the aged, we 
misunderstand the aging process, we see older adults as a threat to our worldview, or a 
completely different reason? Cross-cultural studies are extremely important for these 
questions. For instance, some cultures routinely have three or four generations living 
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together while others do not. Does the increased familiarity with aging decrease ageism? 
A societal conflict is inevitable when we combine the physical degeneration, the increased 
life expectancy most people enjoy, and the dichotomous stereotypes about older adults. 
Because of the high stakes and competition for limited resources (i.e., jobs and salaries), 
the workplace has been one setting for this societal conflict. Unfortunately, we have re-
sponded by legislatively prohibiting age discrimination rather than first seeking to under-
stand what is causing ageism and why it is rampant. 
 
Acknowledgment – The author wishes to thank Lindsey E. Wylie for her insightful comments on 
earlier drafts of this chapter. 
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that include all or most employers. 
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